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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DEPUTY SHERIFFS MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
Utah nonprofit Corporation, and PARLEY
W. BLIGHT,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS_
MERIT SYSTEM COMMISSION and
FRANK W. PENNOCK, JOSEPH MAZURAN and LESLIE B. WHITE, M.D., members of the said Commission,

Case No.
11856

Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Nature of the Case

By this action the respondents as plaintiffs in
the Court below sought a declaratory judgment determining that the eligible and promotional registers
containing the names of persons eligible for appointment as deputy sheriffs or for promotion
within the Sheriff's Department are public docu-
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ments within the meaning of Section 78-26-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 and are therefore subject to
public inspection. The action also sought an order
compelling the defendants to make these registers
available for inspection because they had refused
upon proper request to permit inspection of the
registers.
Disposition of the Case in the Lower Court
It is correct, as stated by appellants, that Judge
Faux, presiding on the law and motion calendar in
the Court below, denied a motion for judgment on
'
the pleadings but appellants are in error when they
state that it was Judge Faux's "view" that the reg·
isters are not public documents. Judge Faux did not
make such a determination and there is no such
indication in the record. Judge Faux merely ruled
that he was not prepared to rule on the basis of thG
record before him that the requested order should
be issued. It seems only fair in light of appellants
attempted effort to establish a conflict between
lower court judges, to state that Judge Faux, at the
conclusion of the hearing, specifically stated that his
denial of the motion was without prejudice to full
consideration of the issues by the trial judge. Thus,
when respondents describe the "relief sought on
appeal" to be clarification of inconsistent rulings,
they are not properly characterizing this proceed·
ing. Judge Faux's denial of a motion for judgment
on the pleadings is not before the Court and only
Judge Anderson's action in declaring the registers
to be public documents and ordering that they be

3
made available for inspection is the matter in issue
and appellants seek a reversal of this.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appellants have referred only to the Response to Requests for Admissions as the only facts.
Pleadings, likewise, establish facts. Also, for the
convenience of those referring to the briefs a short
statement of facts will be set forth here:
The Deputy Sheriffs - Merit System Act was
adopted November 8, 1960 as an initiative measure,
Chapter 30, Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Pursuant thereto the Merit System Commission was
established shortly thereafter.
The statute requires the Commission to conduct
open competitive examinations to determine the
qualifications of applicants for positions as peace
officers [ § 17-30-6] and for promotion of peace oflicers within the Sheriff's Department [ § 17-30-12 (2)]
and further requires that the Commission prepare
and maintain an "eligible register" of persons PdSSinq the application examination [§ 17-30-9] and a
"promotional register" [§ 17-30-12 (3)].
The members of the Commission promulgated
its original Rules and Regulations which included a p10V]sion that the "eligible lists" (meaning the eligible
and promotional registers required by the statute)
"shall include the names and final scores of all those
who passed the examinations and shall be open to
all interested parties." Rules and Regulations for the Merit
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Sr rvice Comllli.1sion for Salt Lake County Deputy Sherifii

published September 1, 1961. Subsequently, afier
appointment of a new chairman, new rules were
adopted in July, 1967. Rules and Regulations of Salt
County Merit Servi.ce Commission Adopted July 27, 1967.1

The new Rules alld Regulations make no provisions !Gr
inspection of the eligible and promotional registers
and the current Commission has refused to let the
individual plaintiff, representatives of the plaintif!
Mutual Aid Association, or members of the public
mspect the registers. (Paragraph 3 of complaint her0iE and paragraph 3 of answer, R. pp. 2 & 5.)
The plaintiffs in this action made the requisite
demand to inspect these registers, but were refused
access to them. (Complaint paragraph 5, answer
paragraph 4; Answer to Requests for Admission; R.
pp. 2, 5, 15.) Thereafter the complaint was filed sei:king declaratory relief and issuance of a writ of manda.m us or other appropriate writ compelling defendants to permit inspection and copying of the
n:::gisters (R. pp. 1-4). Plaintiffs' motion for judgment
or: the pleadings was denied by the
Merrill C. Faux presiding on the law and mohon
cdendar (R. p. 19) and the case was placed on the
trwi calendar and tried before the Honorable Aldon
T. Anderson. Judgment was entered for the plamlit

should be noted that although the title of new Rules

Regul(ffions would lead one to believe that they arplY.

to/ c:

:i,

entire Salt Lake County employee system, they are m
a:iplicable oniy to the Deputy Shel'iffs and wel'e adopted by ·h
Deputy Sheriffs Merit
Commission pur:"uant to Chap30, Title 17, Utah Cnde Annotated, 1953.
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tiffs (R. pp. 22-23) and a writ of mandamus issued
:r, :Jp. 24-25).
Defendants then obtained an order staying all
supplemental proceedings, quashing the writ of
mandamus, and ordering that the registers be kspt
'.mcler seal by the Clerk of the Court pending appeJ] by defendants. Thereafter, because of circumsL;nces arising as explained in the affidavit of
D2puty Dale K. Gates, reprinted in the appendix
to this Brief, plaintiffs moved that the promotional
be immediately published and made avctilfor inspection. That motion was heard on No·.rember 17, 1969, and it was upon suggestion of t}:e
:ourt stipulated by counsel that the motion could
be disposed of by the Court revealing to counsel
" .. the promotional registers heretofore filed with
Court and that upon such inspection and upon
jp;:iortunity to counsel for plaintiffs to examine the
;I of na.mes submitted by the Merit System Com:<iission to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County the moLon
be dismissed ... " (Order of Judge Anderson
rmlered November 19, 1969.)

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE ELIGIBLE AND PROMOTIONAL REGISTERS MAINTAINED BY THE MERIT
SYSTEM COMMISSION ARE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND BY STATUTES OF THIS
ST A TE APPELLANTS ARE REQUIRED TO

6
PERMIT THEIR INSPECTION BY INTERESTED CITIZENS.

This entire case is premised on the broad base
that the public's business, conducted by the public's
servants, should be revealed to the public and Uwt
suspicion, corruption, and inefficient administration
of public business can be avoided by makmg oftcial acts open to public scrutiny. It must be noted
at the threshold, however, that no charges of corruption are made in this case. There is in this ca3e
no allegation that the defendants have falsified the
registers or been guilty of any improper conduct,
other than refusal to permit inspection of the reg:sters. This is not to say, however, that such refu3a.J
does not create suspicion, engender a lack of confi·
dence in the merit system, and lead to confusie:n
and misunderstanding and in other circumstanc6s
may well lead to an opportunity for corruption.
This fundamental premise of the public's right
to know has been for many years recognized by the
statutes of this State. The Utah Code states clearly
and simply:
"Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a
copy of any public writing of this state except
as otherwise expressly provided by statute." and
"Every public officer having the custody of a
public writing which a citizen has the right to
inspect is bound to give him, on demand, a certified copy of it, on payment of the legal fees
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therefor¢."
19 53.

§§ 78-26-2, 3, Utah Code Annotated,

"Public writings" are defined to include "other
official documents." § 78-26-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated,
1953. Appellants concede that the eligible and promotional registers are public documents which they
a.re required by statute to maintain. It is generally
conceded that under statutes such as this if a record
is required to be kept, either by statute or by some
other proper authority, it is a public record. See

Conover v. Board of Education of Nebo School District,
1Ut.2d375,267 P.2d 768, 770 (1954); Kyburgv.Perkins,6
Cal 674 (1856); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App.

2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957). Thus, appellants may
refuse inspection only if such refusal is "otherwise
expressly provided by statute." § 78-36-2, Utah Coc:ie
Annotated, 1953, (emphasis added.)

There is no provision in the Utah Code, as thern
was in the California Code in the sole case relied
upon by appellants, that provides that communications made to a public official which would otherwise be subject to inspection may be withheld if
the communications were made to the official "in official confidence when the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure." City and County of San Francisco i. SujJcrior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156, 238 P.2d 581 0951).
The California statutory provisions are otherwise
similar to those of Utah and the omission of this provision by Utah is significant. Appellants here can
cite no Utah statutory authority whatsoever even
lhough the controlling statute requires an express exception to its mandate.

8
The California decision relied upon by appeJ.
lants is further distinguished upon the ground that
the information there had been given to the public
body on a promise of confidentiality that the information would not be disclosed (thus placing
situation clearly within the quoted California statutory exception.) But, here, there is no attempt to oi::tam any confidential information. We seek only the
opportunity to examine a list of names declared by
the Merit System Commission to be eligible for appointment or promotion as deputy sheriffs. When
applying for a competitive appointment or promotion a candidate obviously knows that he will be
ranked on the register in order of the merits of his
qualifications-in the case of the promotional reg-isters, as conceded by appellants, these qualifications are determined in part by other factors in addition to the written score. It is almost absurd to suggest any necessity for keeping the lists confidential
or that a candidate would expect such secrecy.
There is no statutory exception
permitting concealment of the registers

The appellants seek to support their refusal
to make these lists available by reliance upon that
portion of the Merit System Act which provides that
"examination papers shall not be open to public in·
spection without court order." The entire secti 0 n
pertaining to examination papers reads:
"All examination papers shall remain the property of the commission, and shall be preserved
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until the expiration of the eligible register for the
preparation of which an examination is given.
Examination papers shall not be open to public
inspection without court order, but an applicant
may inspect his own papers at any time within
thirty days after the mailing of notice of his
grade. The appointing authority may inspect the
papers of an eligible applicant certified for appointment."

§ 17-30-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

This is obviously referring to the papers of the written
competitive examination required by an earlier section [ 17-30-6] pertaining to applicants for initial appoin tment as deputy sheriffs and not to the promotional examination required by a later section [1730-12] for establishment of the promotional registers.
But even if it is interpreted to also apply to the
promotional examination papers, that is irrelevar:t,
because no one is here seeking revelation of any
"examination papers." We do seek, however, mspection of the "eligible register" and the "promotional register" provided for by Sections 17-30-9 and
17-30-12, respectively. There is no statement in the
statute that the registers are not open to public inspection. Appellants infer such requirement from the requirement that an individual's examination papers not
be revealed. Appellants' very argument admits th3
errOi of their position. The statute requires an express
exception, but appellants' attempt to meet this requirement by an inferred exception and that suggested inference is one that is, at best, strained The
case;:; interpreting the word "express" are legion.
It is defined as that which is "given in direct terms;
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not implied; not dubious; directly stated; not implied
or left to inference; ... " State v. Zangerle, 101 Ohw
235, 128 N.E. 165, 167 (1920). See also, Le Ballister v.
Redwood Theatres, 1 C.A. 2d 447, 36 P.2d 827 (19341;
R. J. Card."nal Co. u. Ritchie, 218 C.A. 2d 124, 32 CoJ
Reptr. 545, 552 (1963); Hawkins v. Mattes, 171 Okl. 186,
41P.2d880, 891 (1935); McKeever v. Oregon Mortgage Co.,
60 Mont. 270, 198 P. 752, 753 (1921); St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W. 2d 685, 689 (1%4);
Baxter l'. Baxter, 195 N.E. 2d 877, 882 (Ind. App. 1964;;
Application of Lamb, 67 N.J. Super. 39, 169 A.2d 822,
826, affd., 34 N.J. 448, 170 A.2d 34 (1961).
Appellants argue that because the test papers
are not to be revealed then neither can the score
be revealed and because the score cannot be re·
vealed then neither can the register be revealed
because, although the register would not even reveal the score it would reveal the relatiiiG
position of each man on the list. But that is not wl1at
the statute says. In the first place, the statute does
not prohibit revelation of the score or the results
of the examination; but not even this second sl8P
in appellants' tortfous argument is involved here.
The statute's exception to the fundamental rule requirmg that public papers be open for inspectiun
is express and narrow and refers only to the w1it·
ten exa.mination papers. The same section of the
statute which provides that examination papers shall
not be open to public inspection imposes no such
restriction when speaking about the registers. Had
it been intended that the registers should also not
be oade public the words for so stating were mani-
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lest in this statute itself but were specifically and
knowingly omitted when speaking about the reg-

!::ters.

Appellants are seeking to construe a statute
that is clear and unambiguous. Where the language
of a sta.tute is plain and unambiguous there is no
occasion to resort to rules of construction. 50 Am. ]ur.
S!atutcs, § 225. But if the rules of construction are to
be resorted to, those rules clearly dictate that the
registers shall be open for inspection.
The Commission by prior interpretation of the
statute expressly permitted inspection
It is significant that even the Merit System Commission itself, of which two of the present commissioners were members, prior to the appointment of
its present chairman and revision of its Rules and Regulations in July, 1967, provided in its Rules and Regulations published September 1, 1961 that the registers
would be open for inspection by all interested
parties. The earlier Rules and Regulations referred
to the registers as "Eligible Lists" and Rule 4 in pertinent part read:
"4.01

Lists Required.

A register of eligibles shall be prepared and
maintained by the Commission for all openings
and promotions for Deputy Sheriffs.
"4.02

Order of Priority.

The names of applicants shall be entered
upon the eligible list in accordance with their
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standing in the examinations, including credit
for leadership, merit rating, seniority, character,
and demeanor when applicable and said eligible
lists shall include the names and final scores of
all those who passed the examinations and shall
be open to all interested parties, at the office of
the Commission."

(Rules and Regulations for the Merit Service
Commission for Salt Lake County Deputy
Sheriffs, published September 1, 1961)

Thus, the statement in appellants' brief (page 13)
that they "in the past have refused" to make the registers public and "have felt it incumbent as a duty
upon them to keep the registers as well as the e\·
amination scores confidential" is just not the fact. 2
It is a fundamental rule that in determining the
meaning and defining the effect of particular words
and phrases in statutes, ordinances, and regulations
a practical construction by the officers charged w1'h
enforcing the matter being construed is given gr&at
weight. See 37 Am. fur. Municipal Corporations § 187; 50
Am. fur. Statutes § 319. This is especially so where tre
statute, ordinance, or regulation is ambiguous. At
2The prior Rules and Regulations were not made part of the
record in this proceeding but it is anticipated that appellaniJ
will not object to this reference. In any event, the Court shou.
be able to take judicial notice of printed regulations o! th 1:
public body. See McCormack, Handbook of Law of Ev.idenc<
(1954) pp. 695-6 and Final Draft of the Rules ?f Ev1denfe;
prepared by Supreme Court Committee on Um form Rue;
of Evidence (1959), Rules 9 and 12. In the alternative, it 1•
respectfully requested that this be treated as a request '.01
modification of the record pursuant to Rule 75(b), Utah RuJes
of Civil Procedure, and that the Rules and Regulations be m·
corpora ':ed as part of the record.
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best all that appellants' argument does is introduce
an ambiguity which should be resolved by the long
interpretation obviously placed on the statute by
the prior members of the Commission, including two
of its present members, before appointment of its
present chairman.
The plain meaning of the statute is clear. The
obligation of the Court in interpreting and construing statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention
of the legislature. In doing so, the Court may not
read into the statute, as appellants are asking it to
do, anything which is not the manifest intention of
those enacting the statute as gathered from the act
itself; statutes should not be construed any more
broadly than their terms require. The Court may not
infer that which is not intended to be there. 50 Am.
fur. Statutes §§ 223, 229, 243. As previously stated l::y
this Court:
The language of the statute, as it seems to us, is
plain and its meaning clear, in which case there
is no room for construction or license to search
for its meaning beyond the statute itself and
requires the application of the familiar maxim,
that a thing expressed puts an end to implication ( 2 5 R.C.L. 9 58) , and that no motive, purpose, or intent can be imputed to the Legislature
in the enactment of a law other than such as are
apparent upon the face and to be gathered from
the terms of the law itself.

Riches v. Hadlock, 80 Ut. 265, 15 P.2d 238
at 296 (1932).
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POINT TWO
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES PUBLICATION
OF THE ELIGIBLE AND PROMOTIONAL
REGISTERS.

There can be no quarrel with appellants' statement that the purpose of the Merit System Act "is
to require the hiring and promoting of officers in the
sheriff's department on a basis of merit." This 1s
amply manifest by the title to the Act, which reads:
An act to establish the qualification, appointment, promotion, transfer, demotion, suspension,
removal, discipline, re-employment and job
tenure of deputy sheriffs of the several counties
of the state of Utah based on merit; to provide
for the establishment of merit system commissions in the several counties and to set forth the
duties thereof and to improve law enforcement
by professionalizing those engaged in law enforcement as employees of the several counties.
(See Annotators notes to Section 17-30-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.)

Respondents heartily subscribe to this statement of
purpose and it is because of their strong belief in
this Act and its purpose that this action is brought.
The quarrel comes with the appellants' contentior1s
that the single most important product of the statute
is to be kept secret. Public policy, rather than per·
mitlmg such secrecy as advocated by appellan's,
cries for the publication of the eligible and promo·
tional lists.

15

1

The appellants argue "that the registers in question are not public documents open to the citizenry
for inspection" because of the provisions of the
Merit System Act and "its over-riding purpose being
to remove from political patronage the appointment
and promotion of deputy sheriffs." (Brief of Appellants, p. 3.) It is obvious, however, that the Merit
Syslem Commission may not be any more immune
to the disease of political patronage than is th3
Sheriff and his staff or any other administrator or
commission. The public is interested in having its
police officers hired and promoted. on the basis of
mGriL. To accomplish this, the public has statutorily
supplemented the Sheriff's subjective evaluation d
h1s men with the objective evaluation of them
through competitive examinations administered :Cy
the Commission. The public has the right to scrutinize the evaluation of the men by the Merit System
Commission to insure that it remains objective and
impartial. We may well ask, as the New York Court
did in a proceeding before it: "Instead of resisting
a request for light, the commissioners might rather
be
to welcome an opportunity to justi.fy
their action; ... 'Why was preference thus given?'
· .. it can be answered fully only by a disclosur:e
of all the documents which were the basis of action."
Egall v. Board of W'ater Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467
0912). Indeed the appellants appropriately cite at
Page: 10 of their Brief the prior words of this Court:
"It is one of the cardinal rules of construction
that a statute must be construed with reference
to the objects sought to be accomplished by it."
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Conol'cr t'. Foard of Educdion of Nebo School
Dist., 110 Ut. 454, 175 P.2d 209, 210 (1946)
quoting from Crockett z;. Board of Education
of Carbon Coz111ty, 58 Ut. 303, 199 P. 158, 159
(1921).

The appellants c::.ttempt to blunt the effect of their
refus1l to permit inspection of the lists by sayiriy
t:-iat the rules do permit an individual deputy to
his
papers (even this is required by
statute) and to learn of his individual position on the
rngister without learning who else is on the list ')f
in what positions. That is little comfort if there is a
suspicion that appointments or promotions of oth9rs
ma_y not be in accord with the register, or that there
may have been changes or amendments to the registers. A position on the register is a relative thinJ
and it does 'rery little good to know only one's own
position. In the past vigil =int efforts of some memf---,Prs of the
Sheriffs Mutual Aid Associahcn
h::ve :rPsulted in errors on the lists being corrected
by the Merit System Commission. 3 Publication d
the lists woul.d avoid some of these problems and,
indeEd, may reveal more that are concealed by the
refusal to make the lists public.
3

For example, ,;ee affirl:ffit of Deputy Dale K. Gates "q>r!ntcJ
1)e n0ted that the ;wohlel'1
in appendix hei·eto. It
from the circurnst::ince
b\· thP affidavit of Depuly Gutrs
was in pert r.·•:n]vc>d b:,· th<' o!-rltT of Jmlg-p Amh;rson in tine

c'.lsc, ent2red dt2r the
had hem filed _inrl
ment on a moticn of rcsponctents,
e rnmrndwn 1
a part of the J;:-;t l.J·,· i'c'sponclePts' courn,,'1. i, should <11_' 0
noted that
c:as·c does nnt in anv wav involve <i clisru_r
as to whii'.h Ji,·.•, of n?mes ;1wolvt'd 1n the Gall's ''itw1tion ;'
That- i:-; a r:1?Uer t>nti, <'IY :-'•,'1;;nak frcm ; hisprol';'. 1'·
11 1
in,..;. Apvtr2n'.l" _thl' Slw1·iff
usi,ng :t'l old list f''J\'en_ ,1;
1
b'>
.. on '.JUt wlilch h:.cJ SUOi3E'flU2lJUy lxu1 <l'll• Jckl. the

°
'i'

'

Moreover, the present Commission has super;mposed on the examination reouired by the statute, wrongfully it is believed and contrary to the
cJ:press wording of the statute, what is described by
lhe Commission as a "personal interview with the
Commission wherein the applicant will be rated on
p::rsonality and decorum, background and personal
history information, etc." Rules and Regulations adopted
luly 27, 1967-Rules 3.02(a) (4) and 3.02(b) (4). The
statute, however, [§ 17-30-12 (2)] provides with 1espect to promotional exams that the examination will
consist of only three parts: the competitive examina.tion to test competency, the average of service ratings (prepared by the Sheriff's Department) for the
p::-sceding year, and a rating for seniority. According to the statute the combined weight of service
rating and seniortiy is not to be more than 40% of
the total score. But by the Commission Rule the interview with the Commission is given a weight cf
20% by appellants, outweighing even the deputy's
service rating by his superiors (given a weight of
15% by appellants) and the 5% weight given to seniority! Rules and Regulations adopted July 27, 1967, R'..l.ie
3.02(b) (4). The implication is obvious. Regardless of
the objective scores on the written examination and
the seniority and service ratings from the Sheriffs
D2partment, the Commission has the opportunity
through its own subjective determination to maLeriaJiy affect the position of a man on the register.
Appellants contend that the statute has "built in
it the opportunity for application to court for inspec-
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tion by any deputy or other party thought to be ag.
grieved in the examination and register-composinJ
process." (P. 7 of Appellants' Brief, emphasis added.)
Lawsuits must be based on something firmer than
a mere "thought" and without publication of the
registers a deputy really does not, as a practical matter, know his true standing. The problem shown by
the affidavit referred to above and reprinted in the
u.ppsndix was easily brought to the Court's atten·
hon on motion because this action, involving the
very subject, was then pending. But deputies or
other citizens cannot be expected nor required to
bear the burden and expense of filing and prosecut·
ing a lawsuit on every suspicion of irregularity in
the promotional registers. Revelation of the registers
would dispel much confusion and suspicion.
Appellants assert as their "second agrument"
(p. 11 Appellants' Brief) that if the registers are published the Sheriff could "demand and receive not
three names of the highest applicants as noted in
the above section but the entire register" and could
go shopping and "invent reasons" for passing over
men to get to men lower on the register. This is a
specious argument because the Sheriff could do so
now if he chose to. It is a simple thing for the Sheriff
to inquire of the man he wishes to appoint where l:e
stands on the list. Appellants concede that each man
is entitled to this information. 4 In addition, the Com·
4The promotions cannot be made until the Commission
pray
erly certified the three highest names at any given time,
though the entire list may be open for inspection, because a
any given time there may be changes in the list by_
disqualifications, terminations, etc. and the Comm1ss1on mus
make proper certification of the top three names.

at
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mission's own regulations require the Sheriff to
"submit in writing to the Commission his reasons
for so refusing to appoint a certified candidate."
Moreover, if the Sheriff passes over a man twice, a
further explanation from the Sheriff is required an:l
the appellants' present Rules and Regulations provic.e
that:
"In the event the Commission determines that
said Sheriff's reasons are not justified, it shall
so notify the Sheriff that no further lists of
eligible candidates or applicants will be certified
to the Sheriff, nor will any temporary appointments be approved by the Commission unless and
until the nonappointed or overpassed candidate
or applicant is, in fact, appointed or promoted."
Rule 5.01 (b) ( c) Rules and Regulations
of Salt Lake County Merit Service Commission adopted July 27, 1967.

Thus, this supposed problem exists even without
publication of the registers and, assuming the validity of this rule of the Commission, the problem
raised is obviated by the rule. A more serfous problem is created by failure to publish the register.
I There is, as suggested above, no assurance that the
Commisison has correctly certified the three highest
I if the register is not open for inspection.

I

final argument is that a merit system
I officerAppellants'
will hesitate to take an examination if his
ultimate position on a promotional register were to
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be revealed. By this argument we are now asked
not to mollycoddle criminals but to mollycoddle
police officers. Surely, mature police officers wb
themselves have asked for and support this men\
system based on competitive examination are ns!
afraid to take their position, openly and for all to see,
on a promotional list. Moreover, each man takes the
risk under the system that he may never be pru·
moted: that is the clear implication of not only h:s
comparative performance on the examination, bi;i
of his over-all performance as a deputy sheriff.
The arguments advanced for the cloak of secrc·
cy are so weak and so out of harmony with the con·
cept of the Merit System Act and the past regula·
tions of the Commission itself that one wonders why.
The words of this Cqurt in Conover v. Board of Educa·
tion of Nebo School Dinrict, 1 Ut.2d 375, 267 P.2d 768at
771 (1954) are here pertinent:
"The truth about the official acts of public
servants always should be displayed in the public
market place, subject to public appraisal. Any attempt to withhold information after a meeting,
itself should be a subject for a wide publicity
irrespective of the fact that withholding it might
prevent someone's embarrassment because of inaccuracy."

CONCLUSION
The express language of the pertinent statutGs
and the policy underlying them sustain the action
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of the triat court and the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
L. R. Gardiner, Jr.

Gardiner & Johnson
1320 Continental Bank Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents
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APPENDIX
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNC!
STATE OF UTAH
DEPUTY SHERIFFS MUTUAL AID
ASSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTY
SHERIFFS MERIT SYSTEM COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF
DALE K. GATES
Civil No. 187169

State of Utah
County of Salt

Lake

DALE K. GATES, being first duly sworn on oafo
deposes and says:
I am a first grade deputy assigned to the deter:tive division in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department. On or about Tuesday, November 4, 19E9,
Captain N. D. Hayward advised me that the sheriff
had determined to promote some new sergeants. He
also advised that the sheriff had reviewed the current promotional register previously submitted to
him by the Merit System Commission and that
Deputy John Barnardo and I were in such posit1Gn
on the promotional register that we would be among
the first grade deputies to be promoted. Deputy Bernardo also serves in the detective division with me.
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On Wednesday, November 12, 1969, Mrs. E'ltes,
,he sheriff's secretary, called me and stated that I
was
to be in the sheriff's office Friddy
r:i0rning, November 14, at 10:00 a.m. I asked what
;t concerned and she said, "It is not bad news; it is
good news." I then inquired if it concerned the prornoticns and she said that I vrould have to come
down and see but that it would be extremely good
news.
She also asked where she could contact John
Bernardo so that the same invitation could be extended to him. I was asked to contact Deputy Bernardo and give him the same information, wh 1ch I
did. Early Friday morning, November 14, 1969,
Deputy Bernardo and I were called into the sheriffs
ofhce. The sheriff stated to us that on Tuesday, November 11, he had telephoned Mr. Frank Pennock,
chairman of the Merit System Commission, and advised Mr. Pennock that he would be appointing
some new sergeants from the promotional register
which he then had, and that he would appoint the
men in order as they appeared on the register and
would not jump over any man. The sheriff stated
to us that Mr. Pennock advised that this was satis!ac\ory. In this meeting Deputy Bernardo and I were
shown the promotional register that was in the
sheriffs possession at the time of his determination
lo make the promotions and at the time of his telePhone conversation with Mr. Pennock. Deputy Bernardo was fifth on the list and I was fourth. Also on
the list ahead of our names were Deputies Carl
Evans, John Malmborg and Mike Wilkerson, al-
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though we cannot recall specifically what order they
were in.
The sheriff then advised that at 4:30 on the after·
noon of Thursday, November 13, Mr. Pennock had
appeared at the sheriff's office and advised the
sheriff that the promotional register that the shenif
then had was not accurate and submitted to the
sheriff six new names. The six names were not
necessarily in order as follows: John Patience, Carl
Evans, Mike Wilkerson, John Malmborg, Bruce
Egan and Gary Anderson. Neither Deputy John Ber·
nardo nor I was among the six names. We should
also note that when obserivng the prior list we noted
that Deputy Parley Blight was the sixth name fo].
lowing the name of Deputy Bernardo, and his name
was not included among the six new names submitted to the sheriff.
The sheriff then informed us that because :if
this new list being given to him by the Merit Sys·
tern Commission he could not give us the promo·
tions to sergeant which he had intended to do.
Dated: November 14, 1969.
I sf

Dale K. Gates

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of
November, 1969.
Is I

Camille Kiger

Notary Public

